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Henryk Rzewuski – on the way 
to Polish national philosophy
“For that which only follows from logical deductions, methods 
devised for thought, and disquisitions will only be a theory 
that at best can serve as a wit’s plaything, but will never turn 
into anything vital. Life is inspiration, but reasoning is not, 
and what is more, it is indeed an obstacle to inspiration.”1 
(Henryk Rzewuski)
The general public know Hen-
ryk Rzewuski primarily as a writer, 
author of novels and tales of the 
gentry, particularly of the greatly 
popular Pamiątki JPana Soplicy, 
cześnika parnawskiego,2 which 
is a literary monument to the 
mentality and customs of the 18th-
century, or more broadly, Old-
Polish gentry. The above-mentioned 
Pamiątki made a great impression 
on the contemporary audience, the 
delighted ones including Adam 
Mickiewicz himself. As a unique record of the Sarmatian concept of life 
presenting a nostalgically colourful, but also irretrievably obsolescent 
 1 H. Rzewuski, Wędrówki umysłowe. Mieszaniny obyczajowe, Kraków 2010, p. 140.
 2 H. Rzewuski, Pamiątki J. Pana Seweryna Soplicy, cześnika parnawskiego, Lwów 18523.
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world of the Polish court and its noble identity, the work was almost 
elevated to a cult status. The enthusiasm for the author and his works 
vanished immediately and completely when in 1841 he published another 
book – Mieszaniny obyczajowe przez Jarosza Bejłę.3 The readers were so 
shocked that Rzewuski assumed the odium of a renegade and recreant, 
almost a traitor to the national cause. What made the indignation 
immediately rise to such heights that but a short while before had been 
reached by enthusiasm?
A conservative or a traitor to the national cause?
This turn will not be that surprising any more if we imagine that the 
readers, embattled and humiliated by a lack of self-containment and 
insurgent defeats, could find in the said volume the following thoughts 
and advice:
We who by the act of Divine Providence have become a part of the powerful 
Russian association, let us bring our provincial wares to the general, shared treasury, 
and united with our countrymen, let us confirm one another in the conviction 
that the Russian literature, which flourishes in such vast spaces [...] should display 
Ukrainian, Muscovite, Severian, Volgaic, Donian, Volhynian, Lithuanian and even 
Siberian elements...4
He confirmed, elaborated and enriched these pan-Slavic fantasies, 
at least in his private writings, with specific and even more disturbing 
declarations: “By no means do I conceal that I am Russian by honour and 
duty, which for a representative of the gentry and a Christian is stronger 
than all sympathies that I do not intend to renounce. I took the oath and 
until I am released from it by my lord I will abide by it.”5
 3 H. Rzewuski, Mieszanimy obyczajowe przez Jarosza Bejłę, vol. 1, Wilno 1841.
 4 H. Rzewuski, Mieszanimy obyczajowe przez Jarosza Bejłę, vol. 1, op. cit., p. 235.
 5 As cited in: I. Węgrzyn, Henryk Rzewuski wobec Rosji i idei słowiańskiej, [in:] Między reali-
zmem a apostazją narodową. Koncepcje prorosyjskie w polskiej myśli politycznej, Kraków 2015, p. 75.
157 Henryk Rzewuski – on the way to Polish national philosophy 
Such declarations, which were numerous and expressed completely 
openly and sometimes in an overtly provocative manner, were to be 
found in Count Rzewuski’s writings. The psychological effect that they 
produced, and by extension the social reception of the count and his 
writings were easy to predict - the judgement was as harsh as possible. 
By way of illustration, let us mention an opinion by Stanisław Tarnowski, 
an attentive observer and reader living in the same era, though a much 
younger man (compared to others, his opinion should be seen as a toned-
down one):
Mieszaniny caused a great deal of indignation with the author - as the Cracow-
based conservative confirms - and the indignation never subsided, because the 
author purposely fuelled it with new works. Was the indignation legitimate? Yes: 
the book is undeniably evil, malicious, and malicious in an evil manner, if not evil-
meaning, because its conclusion - which although admittedly remains unformulated, 
can be clearly inferred from what the author claims - is that Poland is not only in 
a state of partitioning, but decomposition, that the soul has long left it, and the 
putrescent body can be neither healed nor resurrected, and there is nothing left to 
be done but to bury it.6
Bleak conclusions, the truculent and revealing tone of the narrative 
as well as the explicitness and determination of negative assessments 
of the Polish condition contained therein gave rise to accusations of 
a lack of writing honesty, stirring up the darkest defeatism, tarnishing 
the national dignity, dissenterism, and finally, outright collaboration 
and treason, all the more so because the author would gladly live in 
Petersburg, not feeling any revulsion at Russia, or at least Russian 
aristocrats and the tsar’s power.7 There is no room here for in-depth 
 6 S. Tarnowski, Henryk Rzewuski. Z odczytów publicznych odbytych we Lwowie w roku 1887, 
Lwów 1887, p. 20.
 7 In his short study about Rzewuski, Tomasz Merta invokes the following epigram believed 
to have been written by “general Morawski,” and directed at Rzewuski: “Well, this Divinity, the 
motherland/ Is but a delusion/For when I rest in the cool shade of these trees/When this soil breeds 
a flower like it used to/ What do I care who treads this soil/ Or who rules the nation!/ All of a sudden 
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deliberations on these accusations, which require a separate, wide-
ranging and reliable study (and arguably it would still be very difficult to 
reach agreement in assessments). It is probably true that “he saw himself 
and his contemporaries as witnesses to the dying of Polishness, which 
now – having lost its statehood and in the face of the definitive end of the 
Sarmatian system of the gentry culture – is doomed to be conquered by 
the Russian Empire – the victorious form of the future civilisation.”8 He 
may indeed have believed that “Poland brought its demise upon itself, 
because it defied its own being. Nations resemble organisms and just 
like them they may (need to?) die. And when that happens, nothing can 
be done about it.”9 However, it would be erroneous to assume that these 
convictions were fully expressive of Rzewuski’s attitude to the Polish 
cause – as we will see, it was more complex and highly ambivalent. 
However, at this point - given the prospect of the issues to be addressed 
in the subsequent sections of the present paper – let me just note that 
in my opinion Henryk Rzewuski’s attitude towards the question of the 
Republic of Poland’s sovereignty (as it was in the mid-19th century) 
was not a form of recreancy or national apostasy, but rather a logical 
consequence of a conservative philosophy – and the resultant moral and 
intellectual attitude – developed by the author of Mieszaniny obyczajowe; 
it is this philosophy that we are going to take a closer look at here. For we 
will be treating Rzewuski like a philosopher, and not a “Sunday” or casual 
philosopher for that matter, but like an author of coherent, complete 
and original thought (though not a “systema”) which he contained – in 
its most condensed form – in Wędrówki umysłowe przez autora Zamku 
Kaniowskiego (Petersburg 1851).
Therefore, as I mentioned before, Henryk Rzewuski was not a Russified 
national apostate, but we would rather say – to use the exceptionally 
appropriate and useful typology proposed by Adam Wielomski – that 
a pig that was lying in a nearby puddle / Having heard the thing out/ Said: Good Sir/ My sentiments 
exactly” (T. Merta, Nieodzowność konserwatyzmu. Pisma wybrane, Warszawa 2012, pp. 242–243.
 8 I. Węgrzyn, Henryk Rzewuski wobec Rosji…, op. cit., p. 80.
 9 T. Merta, Nieodzowność konserwatyzmu…, op. cit., p. 242.
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he was a typical example of a “radical conservative.” A conservative 
like this is characterised by a special attitude to the present whereby 
guided by the conviction that the true reality has died and can only 
be found in memories, he “backs out of the political struggle and into 
the metaphysical field, thus acknowledging the defeat in the empirical 
world. Pushed out of the world by utopian activists, he draws back and 
goes looking for shelter in the world of Platonic ideas. […]. A radical 
conservative’s views are marked by deep pessimism as to the future: 
things can only get worse, because the decomposition progresses day 
by day. Such conservatives like to write theoretical works about political 
philosophy and historiosophy to demonstrate the meaning of history: 
heading towards a downfall.”10
And that is what Rzewuski did: he turned his back on the present to 
face the glorious, Sarmatian past of the Polish people, in order to save it 
by way of description – that is to reconstruct and conserve the Republic 
of Poland in spirit and imagination. It was only there that, in his opinion, 
such reconstruction was possible and advisable. The count did not let 
himself be Russified – he hardly ever mentions Russia and Russianness 
in his numerous writings. Despite the years he spent in Petersburg, he 
reportedly did not even speak good Russian, and he did not write in the 
language (in the literary sense) at all. It all goes to show that the tsars’ 
empire as a cultural phenomenon held no interest for him. But it is true 
that Rzewuski was a conservative (and a radical one for that matter), 
and the essence of conservatism involves legitimism – the conviction 
that the royal authority comes from God, and the people are under no 
circumstances empowered to remove the monarch – and in the author’s 
lifetime it was the Russian tsars who were, by the providence of the Most 
High, kings of Poland. Thus, it was to them that an honourable nobleman 
owed allegiance, especially in the face of the revolutionary ideas and 
movements coming in from the West. Given this context, Iwona Węgrzyn 
is right in observing that Rzewuski was an avowed conservative “who 
justified his unqualified legitimism with regard to the authority with 
 10 A. Wielomski, Prawica w XX wieku, Radzymin 2013, pp. 27–28.
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the necessity to yield to the decrees of Providence and with the attempt 
at defending the remains of the gentry tradition against the plague of 
revolution approaching from the West.”11 Underlying this view is the 
following firm conviction: if we renounce allegiance to kings, whose 
power after all always comes from God, the world will fall into decay 
and become plunged into anarchy and dark mists of bloody revolution. 
Hence, “society cannot for a single moment be left without some 
authority maintaining allegiance.”12 The author of Wędrówki umysłowe 
was an adherent to hierarchical society where estate affiliation and its 
specific ties and loyalties logically precede and are morally superior to 
the ones of the nation. The then conservative thought was a far cry from 
nationalism, associated by the aristocracy and the gentry primarily with 
the destructive “Jacobinism” of the mutinous French crowd itching to 
hang the high-born (which, let us not forget, was the plight of Seweryn 
Rzewuski, Henryk’s grandfather and a Targowica confederate, of which 
Henryk was most probably aware). Therefore, to Rzewuski thinking in 
nationwide terms definitely smacked of plebeianism and subversiveness. 
Order must be based on religion, high culture following therefrom as 
well as the social dominance of the people of noble birth, and not on the 
impulsive and irrational ethnia with its vast reaches. There is no doubt 
that the national feeling is important and beautiful, and in the purely 
human order - the most beautiful and the most important, but it still does 
not stand at the top of the axiological pyramid. “There is undoubtedly 
one feeling aroused by God, which has always been the most powerful 
mainspring of human activity; that feeling is love for one’s country. […]. 
It can be abused, because apart from God nothing should act as a man’s 
goal, but it is certain that we have no single mental capacity that would 
not be associated with love for the motherland” [emphasis – B. J.].13 
Therefore, the divine order and loyalty to the Divine laws, hierarchies 
and duties resulting therefrom have absolute primacy. In other words, 
 11 I. Węgrzyn, Henryk Rzewuski…, op. cit., p. 85.
 12 H. Rzewuski, Cywilizacja i religia, ed. A. Wielomski, Biała Podlaska 2009, p. 43.
 13 H. Rzewuski, Wędrówki umysłowe…, op. cit., p. 119.
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maintaining the order of the “organic” social structure is a value of 
overriding importance – it is overriding because it is theological. In 
the count’s time the pillars of the order founded on religion and on the 
religion-practising gentry could effectively be kept upright only by the 
last feudal lord in Europe – the Russian tsar. Such was the conviction 
held by Rzewuski.
Futility of traditional philosophy
In Pamiątki Soplicy Rzewuski reminisces about former Poland, out 
of which – following the decomposition of its “physical” and political 
body – all life seeped irretrievably. There is no doubt that Rzewuski loves 
Polishness, eulogises and worships it, but in the way you eulogise, love and 
worship the deeds of a deceased man, invoking his image, remembering 
his soul and missing him. Rzewuski is not a recreant; he is a mourner 
and a bard singing a song of a non-existent world, dishing out acrid 
judgements about the surrounding world, so distant from the ancient – 
and yet still relevant – norms and ideals. Noteworthily enough, he is an 
inconsistent “mourner,” because his writings contain some germ of a plan 
for Polishness – that is something that can and should be constructed 
in the future – viable at least in the spiritual realm. This is because the 
reminiscing should become a foundation for immortalisation of the 
Polish spirit, thanks to which Poland would be reborn in imagination, 
art and thought. In a sense, this will be “Poland of the dreams.” It is 
possible to build the national philosophy – the Polish philosophy – in 
which the spirit of the lost motherland will manifest itself, come to know 
itself and will be saved, at least in the ideal, eternal reality derived from 
the Divinity, the one that nations are essentially descended from and in 
which they truly exist. Rzewuski’s plan for a national philosophy is a plan 
of a broader scope. The philosopher’s remarks might be useful to the 
Spanish, the French or the Russians, even though – perforce – national 
philosophies there will be radically different from the Polish one, because 
the spirit of these nations is different, as is their manifested moral idea. 
And the very term “philosophy” takes on a completely new meaning in 
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this context. It is not only different from the classical approach, but it is 
even overtly opposed to it.
And so it seems appropriate to begin with Rzewuski’s view on 
philosophy as traditionally construed in order to grasp the essence of his 
conception of its revived and proper – that is national – variant.
Henryk Rzewuski’s attitude to the existing philosophical reflection 
in the form pursued in his lifetime was invariably highly critical, and he 
found the fascination with the German thought – which nevertheless was 
the crowning achievement of the classical, Greek paradigm of philosophy 
– to be particularly unbearable and harmful. And so the count complains 
as follows: “Nowadays people believe that philosophy is a science which 
can be acquired merely by means of perusal of the treatises by German 
dreamers, as if becoming acquainted with philosophical systems was 
philosophy itself. And that is why we do not have philosophy; but it was 
quite advanced at the time when no one thought of it as a separate science. 
After all, there is more true philosophy in the Statutes of Lithuania, in 
the writings of Piotr Skarga and Maksymilian Fredro than in all those 
weird and stodgy treatises and systemata which have been spilling over 
from Germany since Kant’s time and till this day, and which are but 
philosophical blather.”14
Philosophy thus construed, or “philosophical blather” that is 
expressed in the “systemata” devised after the German fashion gives rise 
to Rzewuski’s sheer and visible exasperation, as he is convinced of its 
spiritual pointlessness and thought futility. The idealist systems of Fichte, 
Schelling and Hegel, which are not very lucid, and yet highly abstract, 
are in Rzewuski’s opinion a kind of intellectual aberration, which 
additionally have become popular with flighty teenagers, infecting them 
with claptrap which is pseudo-intellectual to boot. A speculative, purely 
theoretical philosophy which is detached from some real and specific 
substratum – as it is intended to be universalist (supranational) – is 
a symptom of ageing and dying of the spirit, and not of its blossoming. 
Having been detached “from the ground,” from a specific community, its 
 14 H. Rzewuski, Wędrówki umysłowe…, op. cit., p. 129.
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history, culture and language, thought lapses into senile dementia and 
cognitive impotence.
Philosophy, for which there is no practical use whatsoever; it has an innate 
aversion to action; it only appears in decrepit collective bodies, like gout in old men’s 
worn-out bodies; it puts up barriers to inspiration which has exclusive capacity to 
rejuvenate the aged political body - let me tell you, however generous it may be with 
praise for itself, philosophy is only seemingly learned nothingness.15
Likewise, historiosophy (the crowning achievement of which was 
Hegel’s evolutionary idealism), which was contemporary with Rzewuski, 
does not merit recognition.
The way it is lectured on or elucidated in various writings today, philosophy of 
history is a completely erroneous science, because it is based on a freely supposed 
paralogism. Having dreamed up existence of some spirit of humanity, it claims that 
the universal spirit manifests itself phenomenally in the history of nations viewed not 
as monads, but as particles of this universal whole. In its view, all these phenomena 
occur in the order testifying to the progress of the human race, the end of which 
being disappearance of all distinct nationalities in the bosom of universal humanity 
common to all. It is no use inferring all developments with utmost talent and most 
exquisite logic, if the first principle of the entire systema is a glaring falsehood.16
The author of Wędrówki umysłowe rejects the Hegelian phenomenology 
along with its conviction about the objective progress of history striving 
after the self-consciousness of the Absolute Spirit, self-knowledge that 
will include and unite in its own identity all “that is different” - the totality 
of spiritual – that is rational – life of humanity. Also, Rzewuski firmly 
challenges the reality of the abstract idea of “humanity” as such, viewing 
this absolutising hypothesis allegedly derived from the the nature of the 
Hegelian Spirit as the same uniformising and totalising, and by extension, 
 15 H. Rzewuski, Wędrówki umysłowe…, op. cit., p. 229.
 16 H. Rzewuski, Wędrówki umysłowe…, op. cit., p. 225.
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destructive thought movement which at the social level constitutes the 
essence of the Revolution. He fully identified with the view held by 
Count Joseph de Maistre, who said: “The Constitution of 1795, like all the 
previous ones, was drawn up for man. But there is no man whatsoever 
in the world. In my life I have seen Frenchmen, Italians, Russians, etc. 
Thanks to Montesquieu I even know that it is possible to be a Persian; 
however, as regards man, I have not met a single one in my life; if there 
is one, I know nothing about that.”17 Hence, national differentiation and 
social inequality are equally natural, organic. Abstract uniformisation of 
estates as well as, by extension, nations plunges individuals into chaotic, 
formless darkness, where – just like in the Schellingian absolute – “all cows 
are black.” Elimination of the hierarchical span annihilates social energy, 
which is released (and conveyed in the right direction) whenever lower 
estates respect, revere and emulate the nobler ones, thereby naturally 
perfecting themselves (which is quite the opposite of what is happening 
nowadays, when higher estates – the aristocracy of spiritual services, 
as regrettably there is no other, under threat of “autistic” confinement 
and exclusion is reduced to tastes, needs and modes of being that typify 
lower estates). In the a priori speculated-out society of “equality” energy 
dissipates – just like culture does – and social ideals are dictated by the 
most numerous, and thus the lowest and least developed strata, that is 
the so-called third estate. But the nation is not about a wavering and 
irrational will of the people, but about the metaphysical, Divine idea, 
most perfectly expressed by the few but fully-fledged and most self-
conscious individuals.
The nation as a Divine idea
And thus – given the issues addressed here – we have come to the 
pivotal concept of nation which was developed, in large measure on the 
 17 As cited in: A. Wielomski, Konserwatyzm. Główne idee, nurty i postacie, Warszawa 2007, 
pp. 80–81.
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pattern provided by de Maistre, and promoted by Rzewuski. And so the 
philosopher says:
Nations do not live according to the external shapes through which they 
manifest their being, but according to the idea that moves them. For political bodies 
the idea is that which the soul is for man; the moment the soul leaves the body, the 
form of the body begins to fall apart, which is what in the count’s opinion in fact 
happened to the Republic of Poland – the national idea arose out of the Divine 
revelation and was conveyed by oral tradition. [emphasis – B. J.] Thus we can see 
that the original political form of nations was patriarchal and theocratic.18
Every nation is a development and manifestation of the Divine 
revelation, the Divine idea, that is a divine creation, an eternal soul, 
irreducible to any world-immanent factors or its actual political condition 
(or its “body”). In order to emphasise this transcendent character of the 
national idea, Rzewuski – again like the Savoyard count – expresses his 
conviction about the existence of the angels of nations: intermediate 
beings occupying (since “nature does not take leaps”) the metaphysical 
space in the hierarchy between individual souls and the Angelic Thrones 
and God Himself. The theologically grounded hierarchy (described 
by Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, and subsequently elaborated by 
Saint Thomas and the scholastics) must be observed, and for this reason 
Rzewuski invokes the “patriarchal and theocratic” model. And again: 
we can clearly see that he found the tsarist autocracy, rather than the 
“nature-defying” republican system, to be a better match for this model. 
Viewed from the outside, a nation is indeed a collection of individuals, 
and to be precise – families. But internally, it is a spiritual being with 
a specific internal structure and stratification. As an incorporeal being, 
it lives even after the death of the geopolitical “body” – i.e. the state. Let 
us quote this extremely interesting passage about the angels of the nation 
in its entirety:
 18 H. Rzewuski, Wędrówki umysłowe…, op. cit., p. 97.
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A nation in its corporeality, that is in that through which it manifests itself 
externally, arises either out of one family or an aggregation of various families. 
But that which constitutes its spirituality, that is life, must necessarily be somehow 
affected by God’s breath. […] Every nationality is a Divine revelation which comes 
to be fulfilled in time, irrespective of the creeds espoused by the individuals who 
make up nations [emphasis – B. J.]. In the Holy Scriptures, in the Book of Daniel, 
we can read that the angel of the Assyrians met the angel of the Persians – from 
this follows an obvious conclusion whereby a nationality, as revealed by the Divine 
power, could not survive in its pristine condition if it were not entrusted to the care 
of angels, the ministers of God in the earthly order. Every aggregation of diverse 
particles united into a single entity would immediately become decoupled if it were 
deserted by its angel; a mother country is a united aggregation operating in an angel’s 
care. He provides the citizens with holy instincts for the prosperity of the country; he 
enlightens the shepherds of the people; he lifts the national prayers up to the feet of 
the Most High; he revokes well-deserved punishments for their transgressions; more 
often than not he salvages nations from the bottomless depths. And if crimes, and 
especially ones of a certain kind, have surged in the social body, if the nation, having 
scorned His constant inspiration, not only refuses to cooperate with God, but even 
impudently turns its back on Him, then the spirit of the nation – deserted by its angel 
and having lost that which supported its life – dies, and its place is for a few moments 
taken by some negative egoism and then the dead body begins to decay.19
And thus angels guard nations, which through their agency 
communicate with the Supreme Being. Every nation is characterised by 
its irreducible specificity, or what one might want to refer to as essence or 
even personality. The reason for its existence is exactly the revelation of 
this personality and its realisation in the earthly order. Like the multitude 
of mutually irreducible individual souls is a manifestation of the wealth 
of the Divine Plenitude (their unification being a crime against creation), 
the same can be rightly said about the souls of nations. They have their 
own characters and specific purposes in earthly existence:
 19 H. Rzewuski, Wędrówki umysłowe…, op. cit., pp. 227–228.
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Every nation is a revelation of some moral idea to which its being is attached. It 
lives as long as it represents it – when it stops expressing it practically, it needs to die, 
because changing its calling does not lie in its power, as every moral idea is given by 
God. Deniers of God, who are, however, well versed in human matters, admit that 
nations are incarnated ideas expressed by the collection of families who unite the 
ideas into an organic whole. There is no other way to comprehend history. In that it 
is a nation, a nation needs to fulfil its calling, i.e., it needs to practically actualise the 
idea the representation of which was entrusted to the nation by God.20
How can this calling be recognised? According to the author of 
Mieszaniny obyczajowe it is revealed and advised on by a given nation’s 
history, in which the calling reveals itself, at least to sound and attentive 
intuition capable of identifying it in the nation’s tales. Among others, the 
kind of tales that the count collected in Pamiątki Soplicy.21 In his opinion, 
Polishness is realised in history (which in this sense constitutes a peculiar 
“phenomenology of the Polish spirit,” a record of its “incarnation” and 
march through the inter-worldly life) and in historical institutions and 
customs – and not in contact with nature. Therefore, he who wants to see 
the essence of Polishness needs to embrace the vicissitudes of national 
history with a single glance:
No nation can renounce its past. Its present being and its future must necessarily 
be the outcomes of its past, and the sequence of moments following precisely one 
from another not only constitutes its history but is also its life. In a single man, every 
 20 H. Rzewuski, Wędrówki umysłowe…, op. cit., p. 241.
 21 As Rzewuski notes, within the Polish national idea there is no place for any mysticism of na-
ture: “For gazing at nature - he explains - has always been alien to the national genius of Poland. 
Beautiful views, chirping of wild birds, the varicolouredness of flowers of its land - in a word, all 
the poetry of nature has always been a letter closed to the Polish mind. To him, a brook has never 
been anything more than a place to build a mill; a wild bird, a question whether it is worth a bullet; 
flowers, a question whether they would make good hay for his steeds; a horse, his favourite animal, 
whether its back is good and legs are reliable. Even when he lived in Ruthenia, the poetry of nature, 
which so profusely spread all over the district, could not come to life in him. This can be observed 
in the homesteads belonging to the owners of Ruthenian hamlets; they were always situated in the 
bleakest place in the hamlet” (H. Rzewuski, Wędrówki umysłowe…, op. cit., p. 28).
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moment in which his life has already matured, that is he has the use of developed 
mental and organic capabilities, can only be an outcome of the course of this life. 
A mature age is a logical consequence of childhood and adolescence, and manifests 
itself according to the well-established order determined by the Creator. […] It is 
to this destiny that a nation, or a collective man, is subject. It needs to – like the 
individuals it is composed of – follow the course of its life, in a no less logical order.22
What is the Polish national philosophy supposed to be?
Thus, the nation, as a “collective man,” is not only subject to the 
natural, “biological” cycle of youth-maturity-old age and death, but also 
to the destiny that it can by no means evade – after all God is the master of 
History. This destiny is a temporal development of the eternal archetype 
which keeps manifesting itself in the specific matter of historical events. 
This goes on happening until the vital – physical and spiritual – forces of 
the nation desert it wholly, which presages its imminent death, at least in 
the world subject to the reign of time. Since it is in history that the idea 
of the nation reveals itself, the history is the only appropriate material 
for philosophical inquiry and investigations – all philosophy is therefore 
out of necessity philosophy of history and there is no and there can be 
no other true philosophy. 
A nation’s reasoning is always a fact – hence the history of every nation is its 
philosophy [emphasis – B. J.] – and the latter one is in some respect so constant 
in reviving the same facts that one poet-philosopher, a poet-prophet of our times, 
noted that the real history of one era of the nation is a symbol of its history in the 
subsequent eras.23
As long as it lives, the nation, even subconsciously, every now and 
then will try and realise its idea, the prototype of its being devised by 
God, which may unfortunately result in analogous occurrences in 
 22 H. Rzewuski, Wędrówki umysłowe…, op. cit., p. 237.
 23 H. Rzewuski, Wędrówki umysłowe…, op. cit., pp. 193-194.
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history. (It only remains to be hoped that this cyclicity is not literal or 
unavoidable – it would be terrible to know that the Republic will again 
have to suffer its dismal collapses).
Thus, a philosopher is a “self-consciousness” of the nation, because he 
is the one who captures the idea and presents it to the society – the nation 
acts, but lacks self-discovery. That is why the Statutes of Lithuania and 
the sermons of Piotr Skarga are philosophy: they express and objectivise 
the moral idea of the gentry nation of the Republic, reveal its essence, 
its peculiar modus vivendi and modus operandi. But expressing the 
archetype necessitates a philosopher, a philosophical genius for that 
matter, endowed with powerful intuition and engulfed by inspiration:
The power of the genius is always closely related to the power of the nation 
out of whose bosom it arose; needles to say, to its spiritual power. The genius 
becomes a representative of the spirit of his nation in that he can lend to the 
imaginings roaming around the nation shapes letting them be recognised as 
objects [emphasis – B. J.].24
That is what the philosopher’s task is about. Like the history of his 
nation serves as the “research material,” capturing the nation’s proto-
image that manifests itself in the history is the key cognitive goal. So 
he collects and puts together its fragments scattered in the tales and 
pondered in history so that he can, out of the chaotic collection, “distil” 
and compose the purest form of Tradition.
What “method” is this new philosophy supposed to employ, to what 
cognitive powers is it supposed to refer? Above all, it is not to fret over the 
accusations of plunging into muddled, irrational “superstitions.” In this 
context, Rzewuski perceptively observes (as if he was directly addressing 
contemporary sceptics and relativists):
Anyway, what is a prejudice, or a superstition? It is such a flexible and subjective 
thing that it is common for a prejudice or a superstition to pass for the truth, but it 
 24 H. Rzewuski, Wędrówki umysłowe…, op. cit., p. 33.
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is even more common to encounter minds for whom the truth is a prejudice and 
a superstition. In this regard rationalists are by no means superior to ingenuous 
people, with whom geniuses, that is men of intuition and inspiration, are always 
more willing to agree than with the former ones [rationalists].25
Superstitions have their origins - admittedly sometimes distant ones – 
in intuition and inspiration, which are suitable “cognitive tools” of the 
new, national philosophy. Like Edmund Burke,26 Rzewuski regards 
superstitions as expressions of – so to speak – shared and communal 
wisdom, which always reaches further than purely rational wisdom. 
Thus, the perception of “prejudice” here comes almost as close as to match 
the hermeneutic meaning of “pre-judgement,” that is “preconscious” 
cultural knowledge (or competence of cultural choice in line with the 
Tradition). The speculative reason, on the other hand, which is most fully 
expressed in the monumental constructs of German idealism, is capable 
of attaining no truth whatsoever, because its operation is merely a weird, 
though sometimes peculiarly spectacular, game of empty conceptual 
forms. As a matter of fact, no individual mind has the power to attain 
the truth (because such a mind knowingly breaks with the Tradition and 
the spirit of the nation):
An individual mind is always in error unless it reflects the universal mind specific 
to its nation – and this [universal] mind can preserve itself only in tales. A true 
philosopher is he who reflects on the tales of his nation and as he places them as an 
object before the nation, he lets the nation know its own strength [emphasis – B. J.]. 
Philosophy which deals with schoolish ergotism – which is presently undergoing a 
 25 H. Rzewuski, Wędrówki umysłowe…, op. cit., p. 57.
 26 With regard to this, Edmund Burke observed as follows: “We are afraid to put men to live 
and trade each on his own private stock of reason, because we suspect that this stock in each man is 
small, and that the individuals would do better to avail themselves of the general bank and capital 
of nations and of ages. [...] Prejudice is of ready application in the emergency; it previously engages 
the mind in a steady course of wisdom and virtue and does not leave the man hesitating in the mo-
ment of decision skeptical, puzzled, and unresolved” (E. Burke, Reflections on the French Revolution 
& Other Essays, J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd., London 1910, p. 84).
171 Henryk Rzewuski – on the way to Polish national philosophy 
revival – and which does not refer to tales of any nation, but strives after some absolute, 
and which busies itself with analysing thought – in itself or in its forms – is but an 
eccentricity, and as such gives rise to nothing but logical aberrations. Philosophy is 
an idle tangle unless it is national or goes beyond the circle of revelation. Nations are 
guided by national tales, even though they are not endowed with self-knowledge as to 
the tales; even the privileged geniuses who know how to decipher these tales cannot 
fully comprehend them. A philosophy ready to take up studying tales would become 
a real and very useful science, as long as it does not get confined within the narrow 
bounds of a systema, and does not become a schoolish thing. For wherever a school 
becomes established, the spirit is gone, and left are only forms.27
In some other place, the author of Listopad is more specific:
Reasoning is not a creative force, but only a means of analysing some accidents 
of things. Intuition is humanity’s sole creative force, because it places us in a closer 
relation to the eternal fire of creativity, strong intuition being inspiration. And 
since nothing resists intuition as firmly as reasoning, hence follows the obvious 
conclusion that human reasonings, that is philosophers, who are not – unlike poets 
and heroes – men of intuition, or inspiration, do not deserve any trust in all that 
requires sacrifice.28
There can be no doubt with regard to Rzewuski’s view: purely 
rationalist philosophy is not and never will be an expression of the 
essentially transcendent Truth. For in the quest for it, it uses an unsuitable 
tool: reason “is merely a means of analysing some accidents of things,” 
and not a power enabling attainment of the source of Life, the “eternal fire 
of creativity.” Capturing the national idea can only be effected through 
the agency of a genius endowed with a particular power of inspiration 
and exceptional intuition, which acts as an internal force and source of 
the inspiration. The truth a genius-philosopher attains is always a specific 
truth, that is the truth of a given nation. Above the national truths stand 
 27 H. Rzewuski, Wędrówki umysłowe…, op. cit., pp. 19–20.
 28 H. Rzewuski, Wędrówki umysłowe…, op. cit., p. 198.
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theological truths only, which are the only ones that can be deemed 
universal in the full sense of the word. These, however, cannot be attained 
by an individual reason either - after all they are revealed. They arise from 
revelation and to revelation they refer. Not only does reason fail to attain 
them, but in the process it can only obscure and distort them dismally.
Conclusion
Such is Rzewuski’s outline of the plan for the Polish national 
philosophy, nay: Polish national metaphysics in its independence 
and complete distinction from the German, French as well as ancient 
philosophy. This metaphysics is supposed to seek and express the eternal 
spirit of Polishness, reveal its transcendently existent essence – after all, 
no one will do this for us, Polish thinkers. The Polish philosophy is tasked 
with enabling our nation to regain subjectivity, the shapes of which lie 
hidden in the ancient tradition of Sarmatian Poland. In conclusion, it 
almost feels tempting to invoke Rej’s famous passage that “Poles are no 
Anserinae – they have a language of their own.” But of course it is not 
about the obvious existence of a natural mother tongue, but about the 
language of expression in which – heedless of “sundry foreign nations” 
and their possible influence – that which is Polish and the uniquely Polish 
form of spiritual and social being will be conveyed.
Today, this concept might seem a trifle anachronistic, and yet quaintly 
fanciful – at least for the degree to which such deliberations are suffused 
with theological elements, which today is hardly acceptable in the 
scientific and philosophical discourse - but the message is straightforward 
and, in my opinion, still largely relevant.  This is to mean that a nation 
is an indispensable being that cannot be reduced to “humanity,” or even 
“Europeanness” – it has always been like this and needs to continue that 
way forever and ever, because nations are creations “descending from 
above,” non-relative, Divine, perpetually enlivened by the transcendent 
breath. Thus, attempts aimed at their uniformisation are both in defiance 
of God and (for those who do not believe in Him) contrary to Nature 
and History. A philosophy of a given nation is supposed to convey its 
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specificity and uniqueness, its distinctive spiritual and moral system, 
which contributes to the wealth of the world.
Still, one might regard this concept as highly exaggerated and 
romantically affected – one that could only be a product of an overly 
agitated imagination. Well, that may be true. But let us remember that 
eventually any change is originated in imagination. Sometimes it just stays 
there, but at other times it begins to “spill over” into the empirical world 
as well – after all it is from imagination that the world of men emerges. 
And since with God resurrection of a single man is not impossible, 
then resurrection of a nation, with all its specificity and greatness, is 
not impossible either – such a thought appears to pervade Rzewuski’s 
philosophical deliberations, which are also profoundly religious in their 
essence.
Abstract
The purpose of this article is to present original philosophical concept by Henryk 
Rzewuski. This nineteenth century Polish thinker was (and still is) extremely controversial 
person, accused of national “apostasy” for the Tsarist Russia and the spread of beliefs 
about the irrevocable end of the Polish state. In this text reveals the complexity and 
ambivalence Rzewuskiego attitude towards the Polish cause. This philosopher believed 
that indeed the Polish state will not be standing free himself from the Russian political 
sovereignty. At the same time, however, was an ardent supporter of building the Polish 
national philosophy, which would illustrate Polishness and develop in the sphere of the 
ideal and spiritual. Polish history has to be – within its concept – the material from which 
the philosopher sees that these thoughts and ideas around which crytallized Polish spirit, 
and that reflect the basic idea of moral. The spirit of the nation and its moral idea meet, 
according to this philosopher, the functions analogous to that of the soul to the body – 
is a condition of life and the unity of its geopolitical “body.” 
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